Abstract-This paper presents a novel approach to the CI interdependencies analysis, based on the DBN formalism. An original modeling procedure is illustrated, which divides the DBN in three distinct levels: an atomic events level, a propagation level, and a services level. The first level models the adverse events that may impact on the analyzed CIs, the second one properly captures interdependencies among CIs' services and devices, and the last one allows to monitor the state of provided services. The resulting DBN permits to perform three kinds of analysis: a reliability study, which allows to find structural weaknesses of interconnected CIs, an adverse events propagation study, which highlights the role interdependency plays in the propagation of adverse events, and a failure prediction analysis, that can serve as an useful guide to the fault localization process (failures may have many different explanations due to interdependency). A specific case study provided by Israel Electric Corporation is considered, and explicative simulations are presented and discussed in detail.
RTU
Remote terminal unit. SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition. SL Service level. TSBN Time-slice Bayesian network. VHF Very high frequency.
I. Introduction

A
CCORDING to a widely accepted definition, CIs are those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of them would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters [1] . Electric, gas and water distribution, transportation and telecommunication networks, information systems, the Internet, and finance and banking are just few examples of CIs. The theme of CI protection is gaining more and more popularity in the ICT community. Over the last years, researchers have tried to attack this problem using a large variety of techniques [2] , but none of these have fully managed to cope with the complexity involved [3] . It is worth to mention here the achievements in this field of complex networks theory [4] ; several works suggest that many complex real networks may be categorized as small-world, scale-free networks [5] , with relevant consequences on many properties of the infrastructure, in terms of resilience and robustness against accidental failures or deliberate attacks, and cascading failures. However, a topological model may result a very crude approximation of a real infrastructure, and, to the best of authors' knowledge, studies about the properties of interconnected networks are still very preliminarily. As a matter of fact, modeling the interactions among different infrastructures is maybe the most challenging issue; it is not sufficient to model a set of CIs as a sum of its components because this would not capture emergent behaviors that arise when considering the whole set as a unique entity. Any model not taking into account the concept of interdependency would thus be useless. Interdependency means that the state of every CI influences, and is influenced by, the state of the other related CIs [3] .
Furthermore, in principle, we can analyze CI's behavior in a deterministic way. Nevertheless, both the complexity of a real distributed architecture and the presence of statistical variables (e.g., weather conditions, consumer demand, and adverse events) practically make it impossible to have a complete knowledge of the domain. This means that a probabilistic framework is needed.
In this context, within the European-Union-founded MICIE Project (tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures), we are currently cooperating at the implementation of an alerting system that will support CI operators, providing them with a real-time risk level making use of properly designed abstract CI models. The case study, which is given by the Israel Electric Corporation, consists of the interconnection of three major CIs: an electric distribution network, a telecommunication network, and a SCADA monitoring system. In particular, our approach is intended to provide quantitative indicators of threats and risks for a specific CI, considering both its peculiar vulnerability and the cascade effect on it of other CIs' vulnerabilities.
DBNs have been extensively used in systems dependability modeling, providing effective decision support for problems involving uncertainty and probabilistic reasoning [6] , [7] . This paper presents one of their first applications to the CI interdependency problem; also, in [8] , a DBN is built, but it is intended only to predict the likelihood of terrorist strikes at CIs. Similarly, in [9] , a BN is proposed in order to model interdependencies between ICT systems and power grids and evaluate the risk of cyberattacks. Again, in [10] , the use of a BN is proposed in order to assess the risk of power systems with regard to the possible consequences of cyberattacks.
Our analysis is not limited to vulnerability with respect to external threats, rather it focuses more on CI interdependencies. Furthermore, BNs are not well suited to explicitly take time into account, making it difficult to analyze the dynamic behavior of CIs. With the presented methodology, it is possible to perform the following calculations [11] .
1) Reliability analysis: To calculate the probability R(t) that any of the CI's services will operate without failure up to time t, under standard operational conditions. 2) Adverse events propagation and prognosis: To evaluate the impact of adverse events on CIs, recognizing and preventing possible degradation of services. 3) Diagnosis: To establish a causal connection between the failure that occurred, its possible causes, and its consequences. For every possible cause of the failure, we compute the probability that it is the real cause of the failure. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly recalls BN's and DBN's theoretical foundations. Section III describes our modeling procedure. In Section IV, we give a concise description of the case study and, in Section V, we model it according to the presented methodology. Finally, Section VI shows results of some illustrative simulations, and Section VII presents conclusions and future works.
II. Methodology A. Bayesian Networks
A BN [12] , [13] (also known as causal network, belief net, knowledge map, etc.) is a compact graphical representation of the FJPD over a set X = {X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n } of discrete or continuous random variables. It is a directed acyclic graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows.
1) For each random variable, there is a corresponding node in the BN. Directed links between pairs of nodes specify relations among variables; an arrow from a node X i to a node X j implies that the state of X i directly influences (e.g., in a cause-effect fashion) the state of X j . X i is called a parent of X j . 2) For each node, parents' influence is quantified by a conditional probability distribution P(X i |Parents(X i )).
We will consider only discrete variables, so that the probability distributions reduce to CPTs. Causality is just one of the possible criteria for describing relations among variables; it reduces the BN's complexity and makes the model more readable. The knowledge of the FJPD is sufficient to answer to any possible query, but the complexity involved grows unacceptably as the number of variables increases [12] . However, in many realworld applications, there are often some conditional independence relations that can notably reduce the FJPD's complexity [14] . Two variables A and B are conditionally independent given a third variable C if P(A, B|C) = P(A|C)P(B|C). These simplifying relations can be encoded in the BN's graph (dseparation analysis, see [13] , [14] ). In particular, BNs must satisfy the local independence property [12] ; each node is conditionally independent of its nondescendants, given the value of its parents. Then, if the nodes are ordered in such a way that the index of each node is always preceded by the indices of its parents, it is possible to compute the FJPD by using only information contained in the CPTs as follows:
(1)
B. Dynamic Bayesian Networks
A simple BN does not explicitly take time into account. With the DBN formalism [15] , time is divided into successive time slices, and the system is modeled as evolving in discrete time steps (Fig. 1) ; a BN, called TSBN, is associated with each time slice, providing a static model of the system at each time instant (it intuitively reflects instantaneous causation). Then, the dynamic is captured by intertime-slice links and CPTs, which represent the temporal probabilistic dependencies between variables belonging to different time slices. We assume that DBN's topologies (inter and intratime-slice topologies) and CPTs are time invariant, and that nodes have descendants at most in the following time slice (first-order Markov property). This means we assume that the laws that govern the evolution of the system do not change with time and allows to fully specify the DBN by giving only CPTs and topologies of two consecutive time slices. Typical inference tasks for DBNs are [15] as follows. 1) Filtering: To infer the current state of the system based on all present and past available evidences. 2) Smoothing: To estimate the state of the system in the past, given all the evidences up to the current time. 3) Prediction: To predict the future state of the system based on evidences available up to the present. Reliability calculation and adverse events propagation are prediction tasks, diagnosis is a smoothing task.
III. Modeling Approach
A. Levels Structure
The idea is to follow a service-oriented approach; the event of a service failure is represented as the lowest level of the TSBN, which is divided into three different levels ( Fig. 2) 
B. Modeling Procedure
The first stage of the modeling procedure is scenario driven; different BNs provides a generic representation of the scenarios, without any information about the real topology. The absence of a reference topology becomes important when we try to build a unified TSBN; without topology, we can only build different BNs for each scenario. Furthermore, due to the complexity of a real topology, we detect only that portion of topology that is involved in the supply of services described in the scenarios. This means that a general modeling procedure has to be service oriented, topology driven, and scenario driven.
According to these assumptions, our modeling procedure is composed by the following steps.
1) Identification of relevant services: In this phase, the relevant services have to be identified starting from scenario descriptions. According to the final use, they can be divided into two main categories (Fig. 2) . a) End-user services, to be delivered to end users. They are modeled as leaf variables in the service level. b) Intermediate services, responsible for the correct working of some devices in the infrastructure, we put them in the propagation level.
At the end of this phase, the service level is complete.
2) Identification of devices involved in service supply:
In this phase, the designer has to identify the devices and functionalities typically involved in the supply of services ( Fig. 3 ), based on literature or domain-experts opinion. Complex infrastructures are often composed of the repetition and aggregation of a certain number of basic subsystems, each of which is responsible for the provisioning of specific services. So it is natural in this phase to adopt an approach similar to that of dynamic object-oriented Bayesian networks [25] ; once a general model of a subsystem is given, all the real instances of that subsystem in the infrastructure can be easily modeled by "customizing" the general model, as described in the following two steps. This makes the modeling procedure scalable to large systems.
3) Identification of common devices among different services:
It is necessary in order to avoid the replication of nodes, and evaluate the relevance of devices and functionalities with respect to CI interdependency. Note that so far, no topology information has been used, but only general information about services. So we have a preliminary but incomplete idea about how the propagation level will be. 4) Localization of devices on grid topology: To be done in order to verify the existence of dependencies (geographical dependencies, [1] ) that cannot be supposed on the basis of the generic description of service at points 2) and 3). Here, the overlap of different CIs' topologies has to be evaluated. At the end of this phase, the propagation level is complete.
5) Identification of atomic events:
This phase is scenario driven; the designer has to investigate which are the atomic events and their probabilistic effects on the propagation level. After this step, the TSBN's topology is complete. 
C. Addition of Adverse Events and Services
Threats can be added to the model by simply adding atomic events in the AL and detecting their effect on the PL in terms of conditional dependencies (Fig. 4) . Services cannot be added to the model in a simple way; the addition of services requires the update of the PL with nodes and arrows related to devices, functionalities, and intermediate services that are involved in the supply of the new services (Fig. 4) . For this reason, the identification of all key services is recommended at phase 1.
D. Construction of Relevant Probabilities
The resulting DBN allows the analytical evaluation of all the probabilities of interest, providing alarm levels in a probabilistic sense and making possible to identify CI's weaknesses. However, the numerical evaluation of probabilities requires the knowledge of CPTs. In this regard, there are some differences depending on the level to which the nodes belong; in the AL, evaluation of CPTs reduces to the definition of prior probabilities of occurrence of adverse events. This can be done by relying on historical data and expert opinion or by analytically modeling the phenomenon (if possible). In the PL, mainly two types of CPTs can be identified; there are simple CPTs (containing only zeros and ones) that specify the logical connections between services or devices (e.g., and, or nodes), while other CPTs actually model devices and services. Under the assumptions explained later on in this paper, the latter can be obtained by knowing the failure rates of the devices and services. Finally, SL's CPTs are generally simple (and, or nodes) since they account for the availability of intermediate services or devices on which the final services rely.
IV. Case Study
The case study includes an ECI, a CCI, and an ICTCI. ECI [16] is constituted by a HV grid and a MV grid. The HV (161 kV) grid feeds eight distribution substations. We focus on two of them, let us say S1 and S2. The MV (22 kV) grid (Fig. 5) includes two MV feeders: the first one (F1) takes power from S1 and feeds nine MV customers and the second one (F2) takes power from S2 and feeds four MV customers. At the head of each feeder, located in the substation, there is a circuit breaker, which trips in the event of particular faults, de-energizing the whole feeder. In addition, several disconnectors are placed along the feeders. They are used in case of maintenance operations, fault detection, power restoration, etc. Disconnectors equipped with a RTU can be remotely controlled from a MV SCADA control center using a VHF channel; the other ones can only be controlled locally. RTUs are fed by the MV line through a single-phase transformer; backup batteries can provide PS for up to 30 h. To improve reliability [17] , feeders are arranged into an open-ring configuration (the tie switches remotely controlled by RTU F1 − 4 and RTU F1 − 4A are normally open). In this way, the feeders are normally operated radially, but if a fault occurs, the tie switches allow some portion of the faulted feeder to be quickly restored. In the following, we will use the term section to refer to each minimal portion of the feeder that can be isolated by acting on remotely controlled disconnectors and, for the first section, on the circuit breaker also.
CCI is constituted by the aforementioned VHF channel and a fiber-optic telecommunication network that links the distribution substations. Fiber-optic cables are carried by the HV electrical trunks. This gives rise to a geographical interdependency between CCI and ECI.
ICTCI comprises the MV SCADA and a system for the monitoring of the fiber-optic network (not analyzed here). The difference between CCI and ICTCI is that the first one includes only the VHF channel and passive communication transmission equipment (such as fiber-optic cables), the second one instead includes all the systems for control and management of the ECI and CCI (the SCADA and the fiber-optic monitoring system).
V. Modeling
A. Model Overview
Given the complexity of the case study and the dimension of the model (231 nodes with 995 states), in this section, we only aim at giving a minimal description of the model for The AL contains variables modeling the most relevant adverse events that could impair services and devices. We considered the following variables. 1) WEATHER AT SECTION i: This variable is about weather conditions at the ith section of the considered feeder. Bad weather conditions increase devices' failure rates. 2) EARTHQUAKE: Earthquakes can cause catastrophic damages to infrastructures and long interruption of services. 3) FREQUENCY DISTURBANCES: Communication disturbances in the VHF network can affect the time response of RTU-driven disconnectors, or even make impossible to transfer data from RTUs to the SCADA control center. AL's CPTs are the most difficult to specify because the underlying phenomena are very complex to model [18] , and strongly depend on the geographical location of the CIs.
The PL models the interconnection of devices, functionalities, and intermediate services involved in the provisioning of end-user services. This level is composed by the following submodels (Fig. 6) b) local control, if the communication channel is not available, but it is still possible to control the disconnector from the local control unit installed at the bottom of the pole (there is no loss of PS to the RTU); c) manual control, if there is a loss of PS to the RTU, or the RTU is failed (the motor has to be disengaged in order to manually open or close the switch). The relevance of the first service is obvious. Also the second one is crucial to the ECI operator because the remote control of the RTU-driven disconnectors significantly speeds up the fault-detection procedure, allowing a rapid restoration of the electric service to final customers.
Looking at Fig. 6 , we see that no temporal information seems to appear; it is hidden in the submodels of the PL, which describe physical systems that evolve over time. Instead, variables belonging to the SL just give an information about the state of services at the current time slice.
In the following, some details are given about two submodels of the PL. Based on what we said in Section II-B, only two consecutive time slices of the DBN model are described. Pictures of the DBN models should be read as follows (refer, e.g., to Fig. 7) ; the figure presents at the same time both the TSBN topology and the intertime-slice topology (the temporal links between consecutive TSBNs). Temporal links can be distinguished because they are annotated with a number, the temporal order, set to one (they go from a time slice to the following one). As an example, in Fig. 7 , temporal links always go from a variable to its "temporal clone" belonging to the following time slice (this is represented with a circular link). As we will see next, these links capture the dynamics of the modeled devices.
B. Submodel of a Feeder
Here, we present a description of submodel FEEDER F1, built to evaluate the state of PS to MV customers. At the top of the model, variable PHYSICAL STATE OF SECTION i has two possible states at each time instant: working or failed. A link from the AL (not visible in Fig. 7 , refer to Fig. 6 ) allows to simulate the impact of adverse weather conditions. The circular link instead belongs to the intertimeslice topology, and goes from the node to its temporal clone in the following time slice. Therefore, two CPTs are associated with this variable: the first one (Fig. 8 ) specifies the initial conditional probability distribution (we assume the section is correctly working at the initial time slice), the second one (Fig. 9 ) specifies the state of the variable in the following time slice, depending on the state of the same variable at the initial time slice (Self [t-1]), and again on the current state of variable WEATHER AT SECTION i. Devices' lifetimes are supposed to be exponentially distributed, with constant failure rates. Then, the temporal CPT (the second one) can be specified based on the well-known formula of reliability: P(X(t) = working|X(t − 1) = working, Y(t) = wc) = = e −λ wc δt (2) being X and Y , respectively, variables PHYSICAL STATE OF SECTION i and WEATHER AT SECTION i, λ wc the failure rate associated with the weather condition wc (normal, adverse, or extreme) [18] , and δt the chosen distance between two consecutive time slices. No repair policies have been considered: P (X(t)=failed|X(t−1)=failed, Y(t)=wc) = 1. All the temporal CPTs can be specified reasoning in this way.
Variable TYPE OF FAULT AT SECTION i is introduced in order to model those faults that trip the circuit breaker, leading to the de-energization of the whole feeder; if variable PHYSICAL STATE OF SECTION i is in state failed, then variable TYPE OF FAULT AT SECTION i (possible states: global, local) is in state global with probability p (the average percentage of faults that trip the circuit breaker, a value obtained from historical data), meaning that the failure at the ith section has tripped the circuit breaker. Variable CIRCUIT BREAKER is in state tripped if one or more parents are in state global (otherwise, it is in state closed).
Finally, service of MV PS at the ith section of the feeder is taken into account by variable SERVICE AT SECTION i (possible states: service available, service failure). Since the feeder has a radial topology, the state of this variable depends 
C. Submodel of a RTU
A simple model permits to evaluate the probability for the ECI operator to be able to remotely control RTU-driven disconnectors. As explained before, variable DISCONNECTOR CONTROL STATE has three possible states, remote, local, or manual, depending on the state of the RTU and on the state of the communication channel between SCADA computers and the RTU. So it has two incoming edges: one from the SCADA submodel of the PL (not visible in Fig. 10, see Fig. 6 ) and the other one from variable RTU STATE (possible states working, failed, or noPower). The state of the RTU at a certain time slice depends on the current state of the PS (variable RTU PS, possible states present or absent), and on the state of the RTU at the previous time slice (with the temporal CPT computed again based on the exponential formula of reliability). The main PS to the RTU (variable RTU MAIN PS) depends on the state of variable SINGLE PHASE TRANSFORMER (working or failed) and on the state of MV PS to the section of the feeder where the RTU is placed (see in Fig. 6 the links from submodels of the feeders to submodels of the RTUs). Finally, variable BATTERIES model the backup PS.
VI. Simulation Results
In this section, we show how the DBN previously obtained can be employed to perform three different kinds of simulations: a reliability analysis, an evaluation of adverse events propagation, and diagnosis. Simulations have been performed by using the GeNIe modeling environment developed at the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University of Pittsburgh [19] . This software fully support the instant-based approach for temporal Bayesian networks (DBNs), which we have described in Section II-B.
Since, like in most real inference problems, the computational resources were not sufficient to perform an exact belief update, we employed the EPIS-BN [20] , which is one of the best-available sampling algorithms. It first computes an estimate of the optimal importance function by using loopy belief propagation, then it applies -cutoff heuristic to cut off small probabilities from the importance function, and finally it does the actual importance sampling. The accuracy of results depends on the correct choice of the tunable parameters: the number of samples, the value of , and the propagation length.
In particular, in [20] , the propagation length is regarded as the most important parameter and it is shown that lengths of 4 or 5 are sufficient in practice for deep networks. In the same work, authors recommend using = 0.006 for nodes with a number of states fewer than 5, = 0.001 for nodes with a number of states between 5 and 8, and = 0.0005, otherwise. So we chose a propagation length equal to 5, the value of as recommended, and a number of samples equal to 10
5
(increases in this value did not improve results significantly). Furthermore, in [20] , it is shown that the precision achieved by the EPIS-BN algorithm is very good even in case of extremely unlikely evidence; tests on three real BNs, with prior probability of evidence even smaller than in the case presented here, show that EPIS-BN algorithm outperforms other state-of-the-art importance sampling algorithms and the Gibbs sampling algorithm (an algorithm from the Monte Carlo Markov chain family). Finally, as far as it concerns model parameters, Table I presents a list of failure rates of the most relevant devices. As we saw in Section V, these values are necessary to specify the temporal CPTs. We remark that these are only reasonable and illustrative values taken from literature [17] , [21] . The problem of an accurate specification of CPTs is out of the scope of this paper and, especially for the atomiclevel CPTs [18] , has to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
A. Reliability Calculation
Reliability is the ability of a system or service to function properly for a given amount of time, under stated operating conditions. We measure it as the probability R(t) that the system or service will operate without failures up to time t, assuming that it is correctly working at the initial time t 0 (i.e., initial probability distributions correspond to functional devices). So, here we perform a simple belief propagation without introducing any evidence into the DBN.
It is useful to know how reliability decreases over time, especially to discover structural weaknesses of the network, which may come from bad CIs interdependencies. Note that, when we perform a reliability calculation, we are naturally interested in long time scales rather than short-term accuracy of results. For this reason, and also to reduce computational complexity, we chose a large discretization step (the distance between consecutive time slices has been set to 30 days). As an example, Figs. 11 and 12 present a reliability study involving variables PS TO CUSTOMERS 5, 7 and CS OF SWITCH F1 − 1. As we can see, reliability of analyzed services go to zero after about 60 months.
B. Adverse Events Propagation
Here, we are interested in understanding how an adverse event impacts and propagates due to the presence of CI interdependencies. The temporal horizon is shorter than in the previous case, since a greater accuracy in the short term is needed. For this reason, the distance between consecutive time slices has been set to 1 h.
A simple explanatory scenario is presented in the following; we simulate the occurrence of 2 h of bad weather conditions along feeder F1. At the same time, frequency disturbances affecting the VHF channel are simulated. According to these evidences, the state of AL variables WEATHER AT FEEDER F1 and FREQUENCY DISTURBANCES are set, respectively, to (adverse, extreme) and (true, true) during time slices 5 and 6 (i.e., we are simulating the impact that forecast adverse events will have on CIs). The result of belief propagation is shown in Figs. 13 and 14 . Adverse weather conditions impact immediately on the external ECI service (Fig. 13) . Then the effect of a reduction in the ECI service availability propagates with a delay to the ICTCI internal service (see Fig. 14) , which has a relevant probability of being in state manual (P(CS SWITCH F 1 − 4(t = 35) = manual) ∼ = 0.14) after time slice 34 (i.e., about 30 h after the adverse event, this delay is due to the presence of backup PS to RTUs). This decrease in the remote control possibility of RTU-driven disconnectors is significant since it can slow down the restoration of the external ECI service in the aftermath of the adverse event [22] .
On the contrary, during frequency disturbances (time slices 5, 6 in Fig. 14) , there is a nonnegligible probability of being able to only locally control disconnectors (P(CS SWITCH F 1 − 4(t = 5) = local) ∼ = 0.09), implying a possible difficulty for the electrical operator to reconfigure the network during the impact of adverse events (with again a negative impact on the external ECI services).
As it is clear from this simple simulation, time is a critical point in the interdependencies evaluation, since mutual dependencies among services (the external one and the internal one in this case) can act with different time scales.
This kind of propagation analysis can be performed either online, as a guide to the operator decisions, or offline to discover and correct possible weaknesses of the network that can result from interdependency.
C. Failure Identification
The failure identification process (diagnosis) is conceptually the opposite of the adverse events propagation analysis. Here, we introduce one or more evidences of failure in the appropriate time slices (the ones corresponding to the time when the failures happened), and then, after belief propagation, we look at previous time slices for possible explanations. As in the analysis of adverse events propagation, we can also see which consequences the failures will have on the future state of services. Again, it is appropriate to choose a short temporal interval between time slices (set again to 1 h). The result of a diagnosis process consists of a list of possible explanations to the failures. Each possible cause is listed with a probability of being the real one. Such a result is not intended to be the solution to the failure identification problem, rather it is a useful guide and a support for domain experts during the fault identification process. Nowadays, in most cases, this process is still carried out in a trial and error fashion. Then the availability of such data can reduce the time needed to locate the failure, turning into a relevant quality of service improvement.
As an example, in the simulation that follows, we force to manual the state of variable CS OF SWITCH F1 − 4 at time slice 32, and then we update belief. The result is shown in Fig. 15 , where a bar-chart visualization of the RTU − F1 − 4 submodel is provided. From node RTU STATE we see that the most likely explanation for the evidence introduced is an outage of the RTU PS (P(RTU STATE (t = 32) = noPower) ∼ = 0.59) followed by the hypothesis of a RTU failure (P(RTU STATE (t = 32) = failed) ∼ = 0.41). At the same time, a possible loss of power is more likely to have occurred because of a failure in the MV network (P(SERVICE AT SECTION The same analysis applies to any other modeled service or device. In particular, the same submodel provides another interesting example; this time we set variable CS OF SWITCH F1 − 4 to state local at time slice 15. The result is presented in Table II , which refers to probabilities at time slice 14, and correctly indicates that the failure must affect the SCADA or the telecommunication network.
VII. Conclusion
This paper presented a DBN-based framework for interdependencies analysis of linked CIs. The strength of the outlined approach relies on its generality and flexibility; the modeling procedure has been designed on a service-oriented, topology, and scenario-driven basis. This makes it independent from the specific CI technology, and thus suitable for the application to a vast number of real-world scenarios. The suggested modeling procedure has been designed to be scalable to large systems. Of course, the computational complexity increases with the number of variables; however, approximate inference algorithms currently allow to work with models reaching the size of thousands of variables.
Furthermore, the DBN methodology is recognized to have two great advantages; it is flexible and, even if it is based on a rigorous theory, it is easily comprehensible to domain experts and technicians who have a great expertise on CIs' behavior but, in general, a poor knowledge about methodologies of dependability and interdependency analysis. The flexibility comes from the possibility to model both deterministic and stochastic phenomena, using both discrete multistate and continues variables. Furthermore, the possibility of including experts opinion (directly, as numeric values in the CPTs or in the shaping of the DBN topology) makes it easy to create an interdependency model that really fits the case study.
Results are promising, especially as far as concerns the analysis of adverse events propagation and diagnosis. With the first one, we explained how it is possible to discover CIs vulnerabilities (in particular, those ones that arise from interdependency). Vulnerability is here intended as the incapacity of guarantying the correct provisioning of services, and it is measured in a probabilistic sense. This makes the indicator very readable and easy to use for the operator.
Also results from diagnosis analysis are good. This issue has a great importance in the industrial world, because the failure identification process today is still a trial and error, time-consuming task. Apart for the simplicity of the exposed example, we illustrated how DBN inference allows to list possible causes of failures from the most-probable one to the less-probable one. This can speed up the fault localization process and reduce the services restoration time, resulting in a significant benefit for the costumers and the operator.
Future Works: Of course, our work has some limitations and assumptions, which may be relaxed in future research; more detailed models can be obtained including continuous variables, distinguishing among different failure modalities, introducing other failure distributions, and others.
In particular, future developments will be about a more accurate assessment of CPTs, and the understanding of the needed granularity level of the model that can provide operators with meaningful service availability data.
